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ABSTRACT
In this paper we propose novel randomized subspace
methods to detect anomalies in Internet Protocol net-
works. Given a data matrix containing information
about network traffic, the proposed approaches perform
a normal-plus-anomalous matrix decomposition aided by
random subspace techniques and subsequently detect traffic
anomalies in the anomalous subspace using a statistical test.
Experimental results demonstrate improvement over the
traditional principal component analysis-based subspace
methods in terms of robustness to noise and detection rate.
Keywords— anomaly detection, PCA subspace meth-
ods, orthonormal basis, Q-statistic.
1. INTRODUCTION
Network anomalies typically refer to abnormal behavior
in the network traffic such as traffic volume, bandwidth
and protocol use, which indicate a potential threat. Traf-
fic anomalies may arise due to various causes ranging from
network attacks such as denials-of-service (DoS) and net-
work scans, to atypical circumstances such as flash-crowds
and failures, which can have serious destructive effects on
the performance and security of Internet Protocol (IP) net-
works [1], [2].
The seminal paper by Lakhina et al. [3] first employed
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [4] to detect network-
wide traffic anomalies. Given a matrix of link traffic data
Y, the approach performs a normal-plus-anomalous matrix
decomposition (i.e., Y = Yˆ + Y˜) using (a specific num-
ber of) its principal components and seeks anomalies in the
anomalous subspace Y˜. The emergence of this approach
inspired researchers to improve its performance and to eval-
uate its sensitivity for detecting anomalies [5], [6]. Ringberg
et al. [5] point out that since PCA does not consider the tem-
poral correlation of the data, the normal subspace is con-
taminated with anomalies. To address this issue, Brauck-
hoff et al. [6] propose to apply the Karhunen-Loeve (KL)
expansion [7], which considers both the temporal and spa-
tial correlations. Recently, inspired by the well-established
compressed sensing (CS) theory [8], [9] and also by robust
principal component analysis (RPCA) [10], [11], [12], sev-
eral works have approached network-wide traffic anomaly
detection using these methods (i.e., by solving a constrained
optimization problem) [13], [14].
The PCA-based methods [3], [15], [6] focus on link traf-
fic covariance matrix and accordingly compute its singu-
lar value decomposition (SVD), a computationally expen-
sive factorization, to separate the subspaces. In this pa-
per, we present two novel randomized subspace approaches
to detect anomalies in network traffic. In contrast to the
works in [3], [15], [6], the proposed approaches do not form
the covariance matrix and consequently obviate the com-
putation of the SVD for subspace separation. We validate
the proposed approaches using synthetically generated data.
Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed tech-
niques can successfully diagnose network-wide anomalies
with more effectiveness than PCA and robust PCA (RPCA).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we introduce the signal model that represents IP
traffic and formulate the problem we are interested in solv-
ing. We review the method of PCA for network anomaly de-
tection in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe our proposed
methods in detail. In Section 5, we present and discuss our
experimental results and our conclusion remarks are given
in Section 6.
2. SIGNAL MODEL AND PROBLEM
FORMULATION
In this section, we describe a signal model that represents
the traffic in an IP network using linear algebra and state
the problem of interest. Based on the structure of a network
and the flow of data obtained by network tomography [16],
we can model the link traffic as a function of the origin-
destination (OD) flow traffic and the network-specific rout-
ing. Specifically, the relationship between the link traffic
Y ∈ Rm×t and OD flow traffic X ∈ Rn×t, for a network
withm links and n OD flows may be written as:
Y = RX, (1)
where t is the number of snapshots and R ∈ Rm×n is a
routing matrix. The entries of R, i.e., Ri,j , are assigned a
value equal to one (Ri,j = 1) if the OD flow j traverses link
i, and are assigned a value equal to zero otherwise.
The network traffic model that takes into account the
anomalies and the measurement noise over the links can be
expressed by
Y = R(X+A) +V, (2)
where R ∈ Rm×n is a fixed routing matrix, X ∈ Rn×t is
the clean traffic matrix,A ∈ Rn×t is the matrix with traffic
anomalies and V ∈ Rm×t denotes the link measurement
noise samples. The problem we are interested in this work
is how detect anomalies by observingY.
3. PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS FOR
NETWORK ANOMALY DETECTION
Given the link traffic Y, in order to detect anomalies the
work in [3] performs a normal-plus-anomalous matrix de-
composition such that Y = Yˆ + Y˜, where Yˆ is the mod-
eled traffic and Y˜ is the projection ofY onto the anomalous
subspace S˜, using a selected number of its principal com-
ponents.
The modeled traffic represented by Yˆ is the projection
of Y onto the normal subspace S and the residual traffic
modeled by Y˜ is the projection of Y onto the anomalous
subspace S˜ . Specifically, the modeled traffic can be ob-
tained by
Yˆ = PPTY = CˆY (3)
and
Y˜ = (I−PPT )Y = C˜Y, (4)
where P = [w1,w2, ...,wr] is formed by the first r sin-
gular vectors of the covariance of the centered traffic data
Σˆ = 1
t−1
(Y − µ)(Y − µ)T and Σˆ =WΛWT is a singu-
lar value decomposition.
In order to detect abnormal changes in Y˜, a statistic re-
ferred to as the Q-statistic [17] is applied by computing the
squared prediction error (SPE) of the residual traffic:
SPE = ‖Y˜‖22 = ‖C˜Y‖
2
2, (5)
The network traffic is considered to be normal if
SPE ≤ Qβ , (6)
where Qβ is a threshold for the SPE defined as:
Qβ = θ1
[cβ
√
2θ2h20
θ1
+ 1 +
θ2h0(h0 − 1)
θ21
] 1
h0
, (7)
where
h0 = 1−
2θ1θ3
3θ22
(8)
and
θi =
m∑
j=k+1
λij , for i = 1, 2, 3 (9)
with λj denoting the j-th singular value of Σˆ and cβ is the
1− β percentile in a standard normal distribution.
The singular vectors of Σˆ (or principal components of
Y) maximize the variance of the projected data. Thus,
for instance, the j-the singular value of Σˆ (or the vari-
ance captured by the j-the PC) can be expressed as λj =
Var{(wj
TY)T }. Note that, each row inY, Yi ∈ R
1×t.
4. PROPOSED SUBSPACE-PROJECTED BASIS
FOR ANOMALY DETECTION
This section describes our proposed approaches termed
Randomized Bases Anomaly Detection (RBAD) and
Switched Subspace-Projected Bases for Anomaly Detec-
tion (SSPBAD). Similar to the works in [18] and [3], given
the data traffic matrix Y, RBAD and SSPBAD perform a
normal-plus-anomalous matrix decomposition. However,
instead of the principal components of Y, they employ a
matrix with a set of orthonormal bases Q ∈ Rm×m whose
range approximates the range ofY. OnceQ is constructed,
as will be explained in the next subsections, Y is repre-
sented as a linear superposition of normal and anomalous
components (Y = Yˆ + Y˜) as given by
Yˆ = PPTY = CˆY (10)
and
Y˜ = (I−PPT )Y = C˜Y, (11)
where the matrix P = [q1,q2, ...,qr] contains the first r
columns of Q. Accordingly, the variances captured by the
orthonormal basis are computed as:
ΛQ = Var{(Q
TY)T } (12)
Then, the Q-statistic is applied to the anomalous compo-
nent to diagnose anomalies. In contrast to [18] and [3], the
proposed approaches do not require the estimation of the
covariance matrix from the data and, as a result, the SVD
is not required to be computed to separate subspaces. This
also results in the reduction of the number of floating-point
operations (flops) to detect anomalies in the traffic network.
4.1. Randomized Basis Anomaly Detection
To separate normal and anomalous subspaces as in (3),
RBAD uses orthonormal bases whose range approximates
the range of the traffic matrix Y (instead of the singular
vectors of Σˆ used in [18] and [3]). To compute the bases,
the productB = YΦ is first formed using a random matrix
Φ ∈ Rt×m and a QR factorization is then performed on B
(i.e., QR = B) [19]. To improve the approximation accu-
racy the work in [19] multiplies B with Y and YT alter-
nately. Once the bases are obtained, the variances captured
by Q are calculated (i.e., ΛQ = Var{(QTY)T }) to detect
abnormal behavior in anomalous components. Moreover, to
apply Q-statistics the variances must be known [17], [20].
A pseudocode for RBAD is given in Table 1.
Table 1: Pseudocode for the proposed RBAD technique.
Input: traffic matrix Y ∈
R
m×t, rank r, an exponent q;
1: Generate a random matrixΦ;
2: Form B = (YYT )qYΦ;
3: Perform a QR factorization to build an or-
thonormal basis: B = QR;
4: Compute the variances:
ΛQ = Var{(QTY)T };
5: Separate the subspaces with rank r:
Y = Yˆ + Y˜;
6: Apply Q-statistic to Y˜:
if SPE > Qβ → anomalies;
7: return anomalies inA
4.2. Switched Subspace-Projected Basis for Anomaly
Detection
The proposed SSPBAD technique, similar to RBAD, also
constructs bases with orthonormal columnswhose range ap-
proximates the range ofY which based on projects the traf-
fic data Y onto two subspaces orthogonal to each other (
Sˆ and S˜). First, the product T1 = YTT2 is formed us-
ing a random matrix T2 ∈ Rm×m. Next, T2 is updated
by T1 such that T2 = YT1. Afterwards, a QR factor-
ization is performed to construct the orthonormal bases for
the range of T2. These orthonormal bases will serve as a
surrogate to the bases of principal components used in [18]
and [3] to separate normal and anomalous subspaces. Sub-
sequently, the variances captured by Q are computed (i.e.,
ΛQ = Var{(QTY)T }) to detect traffic anomalies in the
anomalous component using the Q-statistic.
A similar approach to constructing the orthonormal
bases as in SSPBAD was proposed in [21] to approximate
a rank-r matrix, but they construct the bases for the range
of T1. To increase robustness of the algorithm for detect-
ing anomalies, we employ different matrices T2 as in [22],
[23–36]. The random matrices generated include:
• a matrix with i.i.d Gaussian entries i.e.,N (0, 1),
• a matrix whose entries are i.i.d. random variables
drawn from a Bernoulli distribution with probability
0.5,
• a Markov matrix whose entries are all nonnegative
and the entries of each column add up to 1,
• a matrix whose entries are independently drawn from
{-1, 1}.
Thus, SSPBAD switches among different random matrices
and chooses the best one in order to obtain the maximum
number of anomalies. A pseudocode for SSPBAD is given
in Table 2.
Table 2: Pseudocode for the proposed SSPBAD technique.
Input: traffic matrix Y ∈ Rm×t, rank r;
1: GenerateN random matricesT2;
2: for i = 1: N do
3: FormT1: T1 = Y
TT2;
4: UpdateT2: T2 = YT1;
5: Perform a QR factorization to build or-
thonormal bases: T2 = QR;
6: Compute the variances:
ΛQ = Var{(QTY)T };
7: Separate the subspaces with rank r:
Y = Yˆ + Y˜;
8: ApplyQ-statistic to Y˜:
if SPE > Qβ → anomalies;
9: end for
10: Choose the best random matrix with maxi-
mum number of anomalies;
11: return anomalies inA
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To validate the proposed approaches, we conduct experi-
ments on synthetically generated data and compare them
with PCA and RPCA. The data matrix Y is generated ac-
cording to the model in (2) with dimensionsm = 120, n =
240, t = 640. The low-rank matrix X is formed by a ma-
trix multiplicationUVT , whereU ∈ Rn×r andV ∈ Rt×r
have Gaussian distributed entriesN (0, 1/n) andN (0, 1/t),
respectively and r = 0.2 × m. The routing matrix R
is generated by entries drawn from a Bernoulli distribu-
tion with probability 0.05. The sparse matrix of anomalies
has s = 0.001 × mt non-zero elements drawn randomly
from the set {−1, 1} and the noise matrix V has indepen-
dent and identically distributed (i.i.d) Gaussian entries with
variance σ2, i.e., N (0, σ2). We set the confidence limit
1 − β = 99.5% for the value of the Q-statistic for all three
approaches.
In Fig. 1, we compare the variances captured by the pro-
posed approaches (orthonormal basis) with the PCAmethod
(PCs) since they play a crucial role in the statistical test (Q-
statistic) used to detect anomalies (cf. (8)). As can be seen,
returned variances by RBAD and SSPBAD are very close
to those returned by SVD.
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Figure 1: A comparison of variances for PCA, RBAD,
SSPBAD.
Fig. 2 compares the detection rate against the number
of bases for different approaches. As pointed out in [2] the
detection rate combines false-alarm rate and detection prob-
ability into one measure and obviates the need for showing
these two probabilities in one versus the other manner. As
can be seen, the proposed RBAD and SSPBAD approaches
outperform PCA when the measurement noise has a higher
variance. Furthermore, RPCA [10], [11], [12] performs
poorly. Since we consider measurement noises V in our
data model (cf. 2), by increasing the rank, these noise sam-
ples contaminate the matrix of outliers returned by RPCA
and as a result the abnormal patterns of the network (anoma-
lies) cannot be recovered.
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Figure 2: A comparison of detection rate for PCA, RBAD,
SSPBAD and RPCA. Variance of the measurement noises
σ2 = 0.1
5.1. Computational Complexity
The traditional PCA method operates on the link traffic co-
variance (Σˆ) to separate the subspaces. In particular, PCA
employs the SVD which requires O(m3) floating-point op-
erations (flops). RBAD and SSPBAD operate on the link
traffic directly but employ the QR factorization, which re-
quires O(m3) flops as well. Although the computational
complexity of RBAD and SSPBAD is roughly the same as
PCA in the context of anomaly detection, in certain appli-
cations where SVD cannot be efficiently used, an extension
of the proposed approaches can be employed. For instance,
they can be used to build a direct solver for contour inte-
gral equations with nonoscillatory kernels where the com-
putational cost for a QR factorization is considerably less
prohibitive than that of SVD [37].
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed the RBAD and SSPBAD
random subspace methods to detect traffic anomalies in IP
networks. Both approaches form normal and anomalous
randomized subspaces by orthonormal bases constructed for
the range of the traffic data. A statistical test is then applied
and detects anomalies in the traffic. Simulations show that
RBAD and SSPBAD outperform PCA and RPCA. Future
work will concentrate on mathematical analysis of RBAD
and SSPBAD.
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